Ivaldi, Marc, Petit, Nicolas and Unekbas, Selçukhan (2025) Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from European Merger Cases. Antitrust Law Journal. (In Press)

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Abstract

The killer acquisitions theory states that established firms buy new businesses to pre-empt future competition, particularly in the pharmaceutical and digital industries. The theory fuels demand to make merger policy more restrictive. But is the theory of killer acquisitions supported by empirical facts? Focusing on past investigations by the European Commission in information technology industries, this article studies whether acquisitions by large technology companies reduce competition by eliminating future rivalry. Despite the small sample size, the findings suggest that none of the reviewed transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation.