Jeon, Doh-Shin and Rey, Patrick (2024) Platform Competition and App Development. TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1566, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study the development of apps on competing platforms. We show that competition leads to commissions exceeding those maximizing consumer surplus (and, a fortiori, social welfare) whenever raising one commission reduces rivals' app bases. We relate this nding to economies of scope in app development and, to illustrate it, consider a setting in which some developers can port their apps at no cost: as their proportion increases, app development is progressively choked-o. Fostering platform competition or interoperability may therefore fail to produce the desired results. Within-platform app store competition, together with appropriate access conditions, may constitute a more promising avenue.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: French
Date: September 2024
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Platform competition, ad-valorem commissions, app stores, app development
JEL Classification: D21 - Firm Behavior
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure - Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
L40 - General
L50 - General
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Sep 2024 07:15
Last Modified: 12 Sep 2024 07:15
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:129700
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49676
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