Rhodes, Andrew and Zhou, Jidong
(2024)
Personalized Pricing and Competition.
American Economic Review, vol. 114 (n° 7).
pp. 2141-2170.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | July 2024 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Cambridge |
JEL Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 06 Sep 2024 07:46 |
Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2025 09:48 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:129686 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49662 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Personalized pricing and competition. (deposited 10 May 2022 07:37)
- Personalized Pricing and Competition. (deposited 06 Sep 2024 07:46) [Currently Displayed]