Rhodes, Andrew and Zhou, Jidong (2024) Personalized Pricing and Competition. American Economic Review, vol.114 (n°7). pp. 2141-2170.

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Identification Number : 10.1257/aer.20221524

Abstract

We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2024
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Cambridge
JEL Classification: D21 - Firm Behavior
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2024 07:46
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2024 08:07
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:129686
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49662
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