Bontems, Philippe, Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Hafidi, Houda (2024) Environmental Tax Competition and Welfare: The Good News about Lobbies. TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1551, Toulouse

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the welfare effects of domestic and international lobbying in the context of two countries linked by both trade and pollution. We consider a reciprocal-markets model where, in each country, a domestic firm produces a polluting good, that can result in a cross-national environmental externality, and competes in quantities in each market with a foreign firm. Each government independently sets a pollution tax under political pressure from green and industrial lobbies `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Our results mainly show that political pressure from domestic and/or international lobbies can help mitigate tax competition between the two countries, resulting in an improvement in social welfare. In fact, lobbying acts much like a strategic delegation device by changing the social welfare weights in the objective function of each government. The (potential) welfare-improving effect of political pressure depends on the relative strengths of the lobbies and on the nature of the strategic interactions in taxes.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2024
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Lobbying, transboundary pollution, international trade, international politics, environmental tax
JEL Classification: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F18 - Trade and Environment
Q58 - Government Policy
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2024 11:20
Last Modified: 07 Nov 2024 10:14
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:129516
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49543

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