Berriel, Rafael, Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia, Kehoe, P. and Pastorino, Elena
(2024)
Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 141.
pp. 157-177.
Abstract
When is a fiscal union appropriate for a monetary union? In a monetary union without fiscal externalities, when local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage over a central fiscal authority in terms of their knowledge of countries’ preferences for government spending, a decentralized fiscal regime dominates a centralized one. Our novel result is that in the presence of fiscal externalities across countries, however, a decentralized fiscal regime is optimal for small monetary unions, whereas a centralized fiscal regime is optimal for large ones. These results shed new light on the debate on fiscal integration within the EU and its enlargement.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | January 2024 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 12 Jan 2024 09:27 |
Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2024 09:27 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:128956 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48533 |