Tools
Tools
Smolin, Alex
(2023)
Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes.
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 54 (n° 4).
pp. 570-597.
Abstract
A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices.
I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure policies. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory and qualitatively depends on the structure of buyer heterogeneity. The analysis informs on the benefits of partial disclosure in pricing settings.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2023 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | advertising, attributes, call options, demand transformation, information design, intermediaries, linear disclosure, mechanism design, multidimensional screening, persuasion |
| JEL Classification: | D11 - Consumer Economics - Theory D42 - Monopoly D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Apr 2024 08:19 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Apr 2024 08:19 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:128491 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/48244 |
