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Alger, Ingela and Laslier, Jean-François (2020) Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation. IAST Working Paper, n. 20-118
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Official URL : http://iast.fr/pub/124952
Abstract
This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2020 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | voting, Homo moralis, Kantian morality, social dilemmas |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Jul 2023 08:54 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Jul 2023 08:54 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124952 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/47961 |
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- Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation. (deposited 20 Jul 2023 08:54) [Currently Displayed]
