Alger, Ingela and Laslier, Jean-François (2022) Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 34 (n° 2). pp. 280-312.
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Abstract
This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | April 2022 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 31 May 2022 10:02 |
Last Modified: | 18 Jul 2023 10:07 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:126323 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/44149 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation. (deposited 20 Jul 2023 08:54)
- Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation. (deposited 31 May 2022 10:02) [Currently Displayed]