Bierbrauer, Felix, Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas (2022) Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home. American Economic Review, vol. 112 (n° 2). pp. 689-719.

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Identification Number : 10.1257/aer.20171927

Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: February 2022
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2022 12:46
Last Modified: 06 Oct 2022 12:46
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:126112
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43872
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