Bierbrauer, Felix, Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas
(2022)
Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home.
American Economic Review, vol. 112 (n° 2).
pp. 689-719.
Abstract
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | February 2022 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 06 Oct 2022 12:46 |
Last Modified: | 06 Oct 2022 12:46 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:126112 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43872 |