Bierbrauer, Felix, Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas (2022) Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home. American Economic Review, vol. 112 (n° 2). pp. 689-719.

Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.