Tools
Tools
Bianchi, Milo
and Luomaranta, Henri
(2021)
Agency costs in small firms.
TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1252, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (267kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We explore how the separation between ownership and control a§ects Örm productivity. Using administrative panel data on the universe of limited liability Örms in Finland, we document a substantial increase in productivity when the CEO obtains majority ownership or when the majority owner becomes the CEO. We exploit plausibly exogenous variations to CEO turnover, induced by shocks to the CEO spouseís health. Extending the analysis beyond typical samples of large public Örms, we show that our e§ects are stronger in medium-sized private Örms. We also investigate possible mechanisms and provide suggestive evidence that increased ownership boosts CEOís e§ort at work.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2021 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | agency costs, Örm productivity,, CEO ownership. |
| JEL Classification: | D24 - Production; Cost; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity E23 - Production G30 - General L25 - Firm Performance - Size, Diversification and Scope M12 - Personnel Management |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2021 07:35 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2021 12:13 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:125982 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43819 |
