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Yamashita, Takuro
and Zhu, Shuguang
(2021)
Type-contingent Information Disclosure.
TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1242, Toulouse, France
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Abstract
We study a mechanism design problem where the principal can also manipulate the agent’s information about a payoff-relevant state. Jointly designing information and allocation rule is proved equivalent to certain multi-dimensional screening problem. Based on this equivalence, when the agent’s types are positively-related, full disclosure is proved optimal under regularity conditions; while with negatively-related types, the optimal disclosure policy takes the form of a bad-state alert, which is in general a type-contingent disclosure policy. In a binary environment, we fully charac- terize the optimal mechanisms and discuss when type-contingent disclosure strictly benefits the principal and its welfare consequences.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2021 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse, France |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Mechanism design |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D86 - Economics of Contract - Theory |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 31 Aug 2021 15:01 |
| Last Modified: | 31 Aug 2021 15:01 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:125878 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43774 |
