Iossa, Elisabetta, Rey, Patrick and Waterson, Michael (2022) Organizing competition for the market. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.20 (n°2). pp. 1-66.

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Identification Number : 10.1093/jeea/jvab044


The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: April 2022
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Cambridge, MA
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dynamic procurement, incumbency advantage, local monopoly, competition, asymmetric auctions, synchronous contracts, staggered contracts
JEL Classification: D44 - Auctions
H40 - General
H57 - Procurement
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Economics of Regulation
R48 - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Sep 2021 09:32
Last Modified: 03 Oct 2022 11:44
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