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Iossa, Elisabetta
, Rey, Patrick and Waterson, Michael
(2019)
Organizing competition for the market.
TSE Working Paper, n. 19-984, Toulouse
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Abstract
The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | January 2019 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Dynamic procurement, incumbency advantage, local monopoly, competition, asymmetric auctions, synchronous contracts, staggered contracts |
| JEL Classification: | D44 - Auctions H40 - General H57 - Procurement L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L51 - Economics of Regulation R48 - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2019 15:07 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Sep 2021 09:45 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:33261 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/30827 |
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