Ivaldi, Marc and Zhang, Jiekai
(2021)
Simulating media platform mergers.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 79 (n° 102729).
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Abstract
The empirical analysis of media platforms economics has often neglected the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Assuming away the cross-substitutability and/or complementarity between the advertising slots of dierent platforms could damage the quality and the robustness of counterfactual analysis. To evaluate the consequence of such an abstraction, we compare the simulation results of hypothetical platform mergers when the demand on the advertising side is derived from a Translog cost model which allows for multi-homing, and when it is approximated by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model that ignores the dierentiation among media platforms' advertising slots. Ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements on the advertising side would result in overpredicting the losses of the viewers'surplus and in underpredicting the gains in platforms' revenues.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | December 2021 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Two-sided market, platform merger, advertising, TV market, competition policy |
JEL Classification: | K21 - Antitrust Law L10 - General L40 - General L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.) M37 - Advertising |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2021 15:17 |
Last Modified: | 12 Sep 2022 12:40 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:125564 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43517 |
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Simulating media platform mergers. (deposited 27 May 2021 13:54)
- Simulating media platform mergers. (deposited 09 Dec 2021 15:17) [Currently Displayed]