Cremer, Helmuth, Klimaviciute, Justina and Pestieau, Pierre (2021) A political economy of loose means-testing in targeted social programs. Economics Letters, 202 (109810). pp. 1-12.

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Abstract

This paper studies the political sustainability of programs that are targeted towards the poor. Given that the poor to whom these programs cater do not constitute a majority, we show that for their own good it pays to let the middle class benefit from them in a random way. This approach mimics the actual institutional arrangements whereby middle-class individuals feel that they can successfully apply to the programs. We consider a two stage decision process: first a Rawlsian government chooses the probability at which the middle class is allowed to benefit from a given program; then, majority voting determines the level of benefit and the rate of contribution. At the first, constitutional stage, the government cannot commit to a specific level of taxes and benefit but anticipates that these are set by majority voting in the second stage.

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• A political economy of loose means-testing in targeted social programs. (deposited 24 Mar 2021 14:22)
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