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Garrett, Daniel F.
(2020)
Payoff implications of incentive contracting.
TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1140, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/124664
Abstract
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payo implications of introducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does knowthat the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benet from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2020 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | asymmetric information, mechanism design, robustness, procurement |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Sep 2020 13:46 |
| Last Modified: | 27 May 2021 07:55 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124664 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41778 |
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