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Guo, Yingni and Hörner, Johannes
(2020)
Dynamic Allocation without Money.
TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1133, Toulouse
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Abstract
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value evolves according to a two-state Markov chain. The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. We solve for the optimal allocation mechanism. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time. In the long run, polarization occurs. A simple implementation is provided. The agent is endowed with a “quantified entitlement,” corresponding to the number of units he is entitled to claim in a row.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2020 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | mechanism design, principal-agent, quota mechanism, token budget |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 31 Aug 2020 13:49 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2021 08:10 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:124604 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41738 |
