Bonnet, Céline and Réquillart, Vincent (2011) Tax incidence with strategic firms on the soft drink market. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-233
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Abstract
Healthier food diet is likely to prevent numerous non communicable diseases. Then there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact of food price taxation on food consumption. However, strategic reactions of both manufacturers and retailers are missing in empirical analysis. Rather, passive pricing is assumed. We develop a structural econometric model, to analyze vertical relationships between the food industry and the retail industry. We apply this model to the beverage industry and consider taxation of sugar. After selecting the ’best’ model of vertical relationships, we simulate different taxation scenarios. We consider excise tax as well as ad valorem tax. We find that firms behave differently when facing an ad valorem tax or an excise tax. Excise tax is overshifted to consumer prices while ad valorem tax is undershifted to consumer prices. We find that an excise tax based on sugar content is the most efficient at reducing soft drink consumption. Our results also indicate that ignoring strategic pricing by firms leads to misestimate the impact of taxation by 15% to 40% depending on the products and the tax implemented.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | April 2011 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | excise tax, ad valorem tax, tax incidence, strategic pricing, differentiated products, soft drinks |
JEL Classification: | H32 - Firm L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:03 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24382 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3581 |
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