Auriol, Emmanuelle, Flochel, Thomas and Straub, Stéphane (2011) Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-224

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Abstract

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 18 February 2011
Uncontrolled Keywords: Procurement, Corruption, Rent-seeking, Development
JEL Classification: H57 - Procurement
D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O5 - Economywide Country Studies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:03
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:36
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:24174
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3498

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