Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean
(2010)
Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements.
IDEI Working Paper, n. 628
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Abstract
The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as iswell-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players’ attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A “brinkmanship”, an “effort rebalancing”, and a “raising rival’s cost” effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to a variety of policy instruments, from the
issuance of forward or bankable permits to standards and green investment policies.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | December 2010 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | International negotiations, climate change, cap and trade, bankable permits, standards |
JEL Classification: | D62 - Externalities F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:03 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:22587 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3493 |
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