Tools
Tools
Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean
(2010)
Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements.
IDEI Working Paper, n. 628
Abstract
The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as iswell-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players’ attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A “brinkmanship”, an “effort rebalancing”, and a “raising rival’s cost” effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to a variety of policy instruments, from the
issuance of forward or bankable permits to standards and green investment policies.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2010 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | International negotiations, climate change, cap and trade, bankable permits, standards |
| JEL Classification: | D62 - Externalities F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:03 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:22587 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3493 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:03) [Currently Displayed]
