Blais, André, Laslier, Jean-François, Sauger, Nicolas and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2010) Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. Social Choice and Welfare, 35 (n°3). pp. 435-472.

Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).

Available Versions of this Item

• Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00)
  • Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:02) [Currently Displayed]