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Bierbrauer, Felix, Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas
(2019)
Taxes and Turnout.
TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1050, Toulouse
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Abstract
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous platform choices of parties and endogenous turnout. A main finding is that a party that is leading in the polls has an incentive to cater primarily to the core voters of the opposing party. A party that is lagging behind, by contrast, has an incentive to cater to its own base. We analyze the implications for redistributive taxation and characterize the political weights that competing parties assign to voters with different incomes. Finally, we relate the comparative statics predictions of our model to the asymmetric demobilization strategy in the German elections in the era of Merkel.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2019 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Political competition, Income Taxation, Turnout |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2019 12:15 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2021 13:37 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:123701 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32924 |
