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Boyer, Martin
, De Donder, Philippe, Fluet, Claude-Denys, Leroux, Marie-Louise and Michaud, Pierre-Carl
(2020)
Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol. 12 (n° 3).
pp. 134-169.
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Abstract
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2020 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Long-term care insurance,adverse selection , stated-preference, health, insurance |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Nov 2019 10:41 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Mar 2023 14:33 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:123683 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32900 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection. (deposited 04 Sep 2019 07:42)
- Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection. (deposited 13 Nov 2019 10:41) [Currently Displayed]
