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Crémer, Jacques
(2009)
Arm's length relationships without moral hazard.
TSE Working Paper, n. 09-111
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21974
Abstract
I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 16 November 2009 |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:01 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:21974 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3288 |
