Ambec, Stefan, Garapin, Alexis, Muller, Laurent and Rahali, Bilel (2019) How institutions shape individual motives for efficiency and equity: Evidence from distribution experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 81. pp. 128-138.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.005


We investigate how institutions can shape differently the expression for efficiency and equity. We run four variants of the triple dictator game and the trust game in a within-subject design that enables to plot individual patterns. A veil of ignorance, a positional fee and information about others behaviors are successively introduced to the two standard games. Alongside those treatments, we also control for individual preferences towards risk and other regarding preferences. Results show that while individuals demonstrate consistency in their preferences, the prospect of transfers in the trust game and the veil of ignorance increases efficiency and equity. Second, the option to choose their position as investor at some cost attracts the less cooperative players: they pay to be investor and keep more for themselves. Third, subjects who modify their investment decision after learning the average investment in their group tend to move closer to the average.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2019
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Trust game, Triple dictator game, Fairness, Efficiency, Social dilemma, Equity
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C90 - General
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2019 14:00
Last Modified: 02 Sep 2021 07:46
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