Ambec, Stefan, Garapin, Alexis, Muller, Laurent and Rahali, Bilel (2016) Trading off between equity and efficiency in dictator and trust games. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-718

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Abstract

We investigate how people trade off between equity and efficiency, using variations of tripled dictator and trust games in a lab experiment. Equalizing payoffs reduces the return from the tripled investment in the dictator game. In contrast, in the trust game both equal and maximized payoffs can be achieved, provided that receiver transfers back half of the return from investment. We find that subjects sacrifice efficiency for equity in the dictator game but manage to achieve both in the trust game. Most subjects equalize payoffs when they are placed behind a veil of ignorance about their position in the trust game, regardless of their aversion to risk. They invest less when they pay to obtain their position as investor but do not send back less if they pay to be the receiver. Subjects who modify their investment decision after receiving information about the average investment in their group tend to move closer to the average.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2016
Uncontrolled Keywords: Trust game, triple dictator game, fairness, efficiency, equity, experiment
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C90 - General
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2016 08:07
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:54
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31118
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22453

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