Ambec, Stefan, Garapin, Alexis, Muller, Laurent and Rahali, Bilel (2016) Trading off between equity and efficiency in dictator and trust games. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-718

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Abstract

We investigate how people trade off between equity and efficiency, using variations of tripled dictator and trust games in a lab experiment. Equalizing payoffs reduces the return from the tripled investment in the dictator game. In contrast, in the trust game both equal and maximized payoffs can be achieved, provided that receiver transfers back half of the return from investment. We find that subjects sacrifice efficiency for equity in the dictator game but manage to achieve both in the trust game. Most subjects equalize payoffs when they are placed behind a veil of ignorance about their position in the trust game, regardless of their aversion to risk. They invest less when they pay to obtain their position as investor but do not send back less if they pay to be the receiver. Subjects who modify their investment decision after receiving information about the average investment in their group tend to move closer to the average.

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• Trading off between equity and efficiency in dictator and trust games. (deposited 27 Oct 2016 08:07) [Currently Displayed]
  • How institutions shape individual motives for efficiency and equity: Evidence from distribution experiments. (deposited 01 Oct 2019 14:00)