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Boyer, Martin, De Donder, Philippe
, Fluet, Claude, Leroux, Marie-Louise and Michaud, Pierre-Carl
(2019)
Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection.
TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1034, Toulouse
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Abstract
We conduct a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. We find that information frictions are pervasive. We measure the welfare losses associated with these three causes in a framework that also allows for selection. We show that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare loss while selection plays little role.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2019 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Long-term care insurance, adverse selection, stated-preference, health, insurance |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Sep 2019 07:42 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Apr 2024 11:33 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:123346 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32728 |
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