Jeon, Doh-Shin and Menicucci, Domenico
(2009)
Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling.
TSE Working Paper, n. 09-069, Toulouse
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Abstract
We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 27 July 2009 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
JEL Classification: | D4 - Market Structure and Pricing K21 - Antitrust Law L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.) |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:00 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:21960 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3272 |
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