Gualdani, Cristina (2021) An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms. Journal of Econometrics, vol. 224 (n°2). pp. 345-370.
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Abstract
We study identification of the players’ preferences in a network formation game featuring complete information, nonreciprocal links, and a spillover effect. We decompose the network formation game into local games such that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game is in equilibrium. This decomposition helps us prove equilibrium existence, reduce the number of moment inequalities characterising the identified set, and simplify the calculation of the integrals entering those moment inequalities. The developed methodology is used to investigate Italian firms’ incentives for having their executive directors sitting on competitors’ boards.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | October 2021 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | network formation, multiple equilibria, partial identification,, board interlocks |
JEL Classification: | D85 - Network Formation and Analysis - Theory G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure - Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 29 Aug 2019 13:52 |
Last Modified: | 12 Sep 2022 12:32 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:123327 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32701 |
Available Versions of this Item
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An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms. (deposited 24 Apr 2018 11:08)
- An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms. (deposited 29 Aug 2019 13:52) [Currently Displayed]