Blais, André, Laslier, Jean-François, Sauger, Nicolas and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2009) Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-065

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Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections).

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• Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00) [Currently Displayed]
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