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Blais, André
, Laslier, Jean-François, Sauger, Nicolas and Van Der Straeten, Karine
(2009)
Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study.
TSE Working Paper, n. 09-065
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Abstract
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections).
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2009 |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:00 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:21952 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3260 |
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- Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00) [Currently Displayed]
