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Treich, Nicolas
(2009)
Risk-Aversion and Prudence in Rent-Seeking Games.
TSE Working Paper, n. 09-013
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22139
Abstract
This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking
game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always
decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular
contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also
prudent. Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared
to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a
self-protection model.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | French |
| Date: | 17 February 2009 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | risk-aversion, rent-seeking, lobbying, uncertainty |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:00 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:22139 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3201 |
