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Auriol, Emmanuelle
, Biancini, Sara and Paillacar Reeve, Rodrigo
(2019)
Universal Intellectual Property Rights: Too Much of a Good Thing?
TSE Working Paper, n. 19-987, Toulouse
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Abstract
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a model of vertical innovation. Enforcing IPR boosts export opportunities to advanced economies but slows down technological transfers and incentives to invest in R&D. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher world level of innovation than universal enforcement. IPR enforcement is U-shaped in the relative size of the export market compared to the domestic one: rich countries and small/poor countries enforce IPR, the former to protect their innovations, the latter to access foreign markets, while large emerging countries free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | January 2019 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, Imitation, Duopoly, Developing Countries |
| JEL Classification: | F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations F15 - Economic Integration L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O31 - Innovation and Invention - Processes and Incentives O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Jan 2019 10:48 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Sep 2023 11:16 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27977 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/31039 |
