Carvalho, José-Raimundo, Magnac, Thierry and Xiong, Qizhou (2019) College Entry and Allocation Mechanisms. Quantitative Economics, vol. 10. pp. 1233-1277.

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of wp_carvalho_magnac_xiong.pdf]
Download (968kB) | Preview
Identification Number : 10.3982/QE951


We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry
to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through
exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities
and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam
grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider
balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students.
Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to
increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all
counterfactual experiments.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2019
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Education, two-sided matching, school allocation mechanism, policy evaluation
JEL Classification: I21 - Analysis of Education
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Nov 2018 11:40
Last Modified: 12 Jan 2022 08:44
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year