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Le Breton, Michel
(2016)
The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox.
IAST working paper, n. 16-80, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://iast.fr/pub/32808
Abstract
In this note, we formulate a condition describing the vulnerability of a social choice function to a specific kind of strategic behavior and show that two well known classes of choice functions suffer from it.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2016 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Condorcet, Departing Voter Paradox, Backward Induction |
| JEL Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jul 2018 06:38 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:58 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32808 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26120 |
