Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Fayat, Romain (2018) Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts. Economics Letters, 168. pp. 77-81.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32676
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011
Abstract
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | July 2018 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good |
JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 23 May 2018 06:28 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32676 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26023 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 03 May 2018 12:40)
- Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 23 May 2018 06:28) [Currently Displayed]