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Cheikbossian, Guillaume
and Fayat, Romain
(2018)
Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts.
Economics Letters, 168.
pp. 77-81.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32676
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011
Abstract
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2018 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 May 2018 06:28 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32676 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26023 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 03 May 2018 12:40)
- Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 23 May 2018 06:28) [Currently Displayed]
