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Cheikbossian, Guillaume
and Fayat, Romain
(2018)
Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts.
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-918, Toulousse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32635
Abstract
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2018 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulousse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 03 May 2018 12:40 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32635 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25978 |
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- Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 03 May 2018 12:40) [Currently Displayed]
