Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Fayat, Romain
(2018)
Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts.
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-918, Toulousse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32635
Abstract
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | May 2018 |
Place of Publication: | Toulousse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good |
JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 03 May 2018 12:40 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32635 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25978 |
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- Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts. (deposited 03 May 2018 12:40) [Currently Displayed]