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Boyer, Marcel and Kotchoni, Rachidi (2015) How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? Review of Industrial Organization, 47 (2). pp. 119-153.

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Abstract

Connor and Lande (Issues in competition law and policy, pp 2203–2218, 2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31–49 %. By examining more sources, Connor (Price-fixing overcharges, 2nd edn. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610262, 2010) finds a mean of 50.4 % for successful cartels. However, the data that are used in those studies are estimates that are obtained from different methodologies, sources, and contexts rather than from direct observation. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates that provides a sound treatment of these matters and other data problems. We find a bias-corrected mean and median overcharge estimate of 15.47 and 16.01 %. Our results have significant antitrust policy implications.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Antitrust, Cartel overcharges, Heckman correction, Antitrust Cartel overcharges, Kullback–Leibler divergence, Meta-analysis
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 May 2018 13:45
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:57
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32076
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25703

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