Boyer, Marcel and Kotchoni, Rachidi
(2015)
How Much Do Cartels Overcharge?
Review of Industrial Organization, 47 (2).
pp. 119-153.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
Connor and Lande (Issues in competition law and policy, pp 2203–2218, 2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31–49 %. By examining more sources, Connor (Price-fixing overcharges, 2nd edn. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610262, 2010) finds a mean of 50.4 % for successful cartels. However, the data that are used in those studies are estimates that are obtained from different methodologies, sources, and contexts rather than from direct observation. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates that provides a sound treatment of these matters and other data problems. We find a bias-corrected mean and median overcharge estimate of 15.47 and 16.01 %. Our results have significant antitrust policy implications.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Date: | September 2015 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Antitrust, Cartel overcharges, Heckman correction, Antitrust Cartel overcharges, Kullback–Leibler divergence, Meta-analysis |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 16 May 2018 13:45 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:32076 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25703 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:41)
- How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? (deposited 16 May 2018 13:45) [Currently Displayed]