Canta, Chiara and Cremer, Helmuth
(2017)
Long-term care policy with nonlinear strategic bequests.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-839, Toulouse

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Abstract
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when children differ in their cost of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to a "bequests rule" specifying a transfer conditional on the level of informal care. Care provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards in order to minimize the rent of low-cost ones. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents' and children's utility. The optimal uniform public LTC provision strikes a balance between insurance and children's utility. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion less than full insurance is provided to mitigate the distortion on informal care which reduces children's rents. A nonuniform policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides full insurance even against the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. Quite surprisingly the level of informal care induced by the optimal (uniform or nonuniform) policy always increases in the children's' welfare weight.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | September 2017 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Long-term care, informal care, strategic bequests, asymmetric information |
JEL Classification: | H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 16 Apr 2018 15:28 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:57 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31970 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25679 |
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