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Rey, Patrick
and Salant, David J.
(2017)
Allocating essential inputs.
TSE Working Paper, n. 17-820, Toulouse
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Abstract
Regulators must often allocate essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, which can transform the structure of the downstream market. These decisions involve a trade-off, as provisions aimed at fostering competition and lowering prices for consumers, also tend to limit the proceeds from the sale of the inputs. We first characterize the optimal allocation, from the standpoints of consumer and total welfare. We then note that standard auctions yield substantially different outcomes. Finally, we show how various regulatory instruments can be used to implement the desired allocation.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2017 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Auctions, Market design, Essential inputs, Regulation, Antitrust |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D44 - Auctions D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L51 - Economics of Regulation |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Apr 2018 14:00 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Sep 2023 07:00 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31784 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25624 |
