Biglaiser, Gary, Crémer, Jacques and Dobos, Gergely (2016) Heterogenous switching costs. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 47. pp. 62-87.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31233
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.003
Abstract
We consider a simple two period model where consumers have different switching costs. Before the market opens, there was an incumbent who sold to all consumers. We identify the equilibrium both with Stackelberg and Bertrand competition and show how the presence of low switching cost consumers benefits the incumbent, despite the fact that it never sells to any of them.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | July 2016 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | switching, cost |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 05 Dec 2016 13:21 |
Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2021 08:00 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31233 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22543 |
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Heterogenous switching costs. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:40)
- Heterogenous switching costs. (deposited 05 Dec 2016 13:21) [Currently Displayed]