Gagnepain, Philippe and Ivaldi, Marc (2017) Economic efficiency and political capture in public service contracts. Journal of Industrial Economics, 65 (1). pp. 1-38.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/joie.12118

Abstract

We consider contrac ts f or public transport services between a p ublicauthority and a transport operator. We b ui ld a struct ural endo gen ousswitching model w her e the contract choice re su lts from the combinedef fect s of the incentiviza tion scheme aimed a t monitoring the opera tor?sef fic iency and the politi cal agenda followed by the r egulator to accountfor the v oice of pri vate inter ests. Our resu lts support theoreticalpr ediction s a s they suggest tha t cost-plus contracts entail a higher costfor society than fix ed-price contracts b ut allo w the public authority toleave a rent to a subset of ind i viduals. Accountin g f o r transfers tointer est groups in welfar e computations reduces the welfar e ga p betweencost-plus and fix ed-price regimes.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2017
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 28 Sep 2016 08:30
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:54
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31012
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22399
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