Gagnepain, Philippe and Ivaldi, Marc
(2017)
Economic efficiency and political capture in public service contracts.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 65 (1).
pp. 1-38.
Abstract
We consider contrac ts f or public transport services between a p ublicauthority and a transport operator. We b ui ld a struct ural endo gen ousswitching model w her e the contract choice re su lts from the combinedef fect s of the incentiviza tion scheme aimed a t monitoring the opera tor?sef fic iency and the politi cal agenda followed by the r egulator to accountfor the v oice of pri vate inter ests. Our resu lts support theoreticalpr ediction s a s they suggest tha t cost-plus contracts entail a higher costfor society than fix ed-price contracts b ut allo w the public authority toleave a rent to a subset of ind i viduals. Accountin g f o r transfers tointer est groups in welfar e computations reduces the welfar e ga p betweencost-plus and fix ed-price regimes.
Item Type: | Article |
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Language: | English |
Date: | March 2017 |
Refereed: | Yes |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 28 Sep 2016 08:30 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:54 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31012 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22399 |