Jeon, Doh-Shin, Kim, Byung-Cheol and Menicucci, Domenico (2016) Second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-690, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The
incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with
internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal.
Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling can be optimal due
to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge
from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves
welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: September 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: platform, price discrimination, two-sided markets, non-responsiveness, spence effect
JEL Classification: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
M3 - Marketing and Advertising
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2016 08:11
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2021 13:46
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:30705
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22343
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