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Cremer, Helmuth
, Pestieau, Pierre and Roeder, Kerstin
(2016)
Social long-term care insurance with two-sided altruism.
Research in Economics, vol.70.
pp. 101-109.
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Abstract
This paper studies the design of a social long-term care (LTC) insurance when altruism is two-sided. The laissez-faire solution is not efficient, unless there is perfect altruism. Under full information, the rst-best can be decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal aid, a linear tax on bequests when the parent is dependent and state specic lump-sum transfers which provide insurance. We also study a second-best scheme comprising a LTC benet, a payroll tax on childrens earnings and an inheritance tax. This scheme redistributes resources across individuals and between the states of nature and the tax on childrens labor enhances informal care to compensate for the childrens possible less than full altruism.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Long-term care, Two-sided altruism |
| JEL Classification: | H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Apr 2016 12:26 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:52 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:30379 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/20315 |
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Social long-term care insurance with two-sided altruism. (deposited 21 Sep 2015 13:08)
- Social long-term care insurance with two-sided altruism. (deposited 19 Apr 2016 12:26) [Currently Displayed]
