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Panova, Elena
(2015)
A Passion for Voting.
Games and Economic Behavior, 90.
pp. 44-65.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28913
Identification Number : 10.2139/ssrn.1805067
Abstract
We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2015 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Expressive voting, Self-signaling, Ignorant voting, Habitual voting, Bandwagon and underdog effects, Information aggregation in elections, Status quo bias |
| JEL Classification: | D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief P16 - Political Economy |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Apr 2016 11:15 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Feb 2025 12:35 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28913 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/20311 |
