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Rhodes, Andrew and Wilson, Chris (2015) False Advertising. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-614, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29998
Abstract
There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives and establish a set of demand and parameter conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising. Further analysis considers some wider issues including the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2015 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Misleading Advertising, Product Quality, Pass-through, Self-Regulation |
| JEL Classification: | D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility M37 - Advertising |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Apr 2016 11:23 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Jul 2018 12:53 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29998 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19204 |
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- False Advertising. (deposited 18 Apr 2016 11:23) [Currently Displayed]
