Fack, Gabrielle, Grenet, Julien and He, Yinghua (2015) Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-607, Toulouse

[thumbnail of wp_tse_607.pdf]
Download (1MB) | Preview


We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she is qualified for ex post. Having illustrated the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2015
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism, School Choice, Stable Matching, Student Preferences, Admission Criteria
JEL Classification: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D50 - General
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
I21 - Analysis of Education
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 05 Nov 2015 15:10
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:50
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:29845
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18607
View Item


Downloads per month over past year