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He, Yinghua
, Li, Sanxi and Yan, Jianye
(2015)
Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective.
Economics Letters, vol. 133.
pp. 40-44.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29515
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.007
Abstract
All (random) assignments/allocations without transfers can be considered as market outcomes with personalized prices and an equal income. Prices proportional across agents imply efficiency; common prices lead to efficiency and envy-freeness. This market perspective also reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2015 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Allocation without transfers, competitive equilibrium, equal incomes, market perspective, envy-free, Pareto efficient, coalitional-envy-free |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2015 13:08 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2021 13:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29515 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18419 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:56)
- Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective. (deposited 21 Sep 2015 13:08) [Currently Displayed]
