Tools
Tools
Le Breton, Michel
and Weber, Shlomo
(2005)
Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation.
In: Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions
Demange, Gabrielle and Wooders, Myrna (eds.)
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 8.
pp. 266-287.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/1655
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2005 |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:49 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:34 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:1655 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/1751 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:50)
- Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:49) [Currently Displayed]
